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Most violence is not committed by persons with mental ill-
ness . . . . Attempts that aim to prevent events like those that took 
place at Columbine and Virginia Tech by focusing on detection 
and intervention among persons with severe mental illness will 




Although in the past social scientists and psychiatrists have consis-
tently overestimated their abilities to predict violence and to iden-
tify dangerousness, our knowledge may have progressed to the 
point that we can now accurately predict violence and identify 




The vast majority of states require that, for purposes of involun-
tary commitment, an individual must: (1) have a mental illness and 
 
 1 Douglas Mossman, The Imperfection of Protection Through Detection and Interven-
tion, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 109, 136 (2009).  Mossman further states that “one can give 
many solid (and better) reasons for treating mental illness besides reducing violence, 
and mental illness contributes to just a small fraction of the violence that Americans 
experience.”  Id. at 140. 
 2 John Parry, Involuntary Civil Commitment in the 90s: A Constitutional Perspective, 18 
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 320, 321 (1994). 
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(2) present an imminent or substantial danger to himself or herself 
or others.
3
  The problem with this standard is that it leaves open the 
possibility for non-mentally ill individuals to commit horrific acts of 
violence because, without such illness, they would not meet the stan-
dard for involuntary commitment.  Based upon numerous empirical 
studies, mental illness, in and of itself, does not bear a significant 
causal relationship to violent behavior.
4
  In fact, mental illness is only 
a causal factor in violent behavior when it is accompanied by and co-
occurs with another factor known to have a causal relation to vi-
olence, such as substance abuse.
5
 
Furthermore, empirical studies have identified a substantial 
amount of environmental and biological factors—such as frontal lobe 
disorder and other brain injuries—that are causally related to violent 
acts, and it is these and other factors that should be incorporated into 
modern statutory schemes governing involuntary civil confinement.
6
  
Otherwise, individuals that may be biologically prone to violence—or 
may become violent based upon environmental factors—can and will 
commit acts of violence because there exists no means of intervention 




 3 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.30.755(a) (West 2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
36-540(A) (2011) (West); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5250 (West 2010); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 27-65-105(1)(a)(I) (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 5010 (West 
2010); D.C. CODE § 21-545(b)(2) (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(9.1) (West 2010). 
 4 See JULIO ARBOLEDA-FLÓREZ ET AL., PUB. HEALTH AGENCY OF CAN., MENTAL 
ILLNESS AND VIOLENCE: PROOF OR STEREOTYPE? (1996), available at http://www.phac-
aspc.gc.ca/mh-sm/pubs/mental_illness/index-eng.php; Hon. Cynthia Loo, Predicting 
Violence in the Mentally Ill, CRIM. DOCKET (July 2007), http://www.lacba.org/ 
showpage.cfm?pageid=8032; Drugs and Alcohol, Not Mental Illness, Explains Violent 
Crime Risk, U. OXFORD (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www.ox.ac.uk/media/ 
news_stories/2010/100907.html; John M. Grohol, Dispelling the Myth of Violence and 
Mental Illness, PSYCHCENTRAL (June 1998), http://psychcentral.com/archives/ 
violence.htm; Violence and Mental Illness, CANADIAN MENTAL HEALTH ASS’N, 
http://cmha.ca/bins/content_page.asp?cid=3-108 (last visited Apr. 25, 2011). 
 5 Loo, supra note 4.  
 6 See Dawn J. Post, Preventative Victimization: Assessing Future Dangerousness in Sex-
ual Predators for Purposes of Indeterminate Civil Commitment, 21 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & 
POL’Y 177, 207–08 (1999) (including a non-exhaustive list of causal factors such as 
“age, sex, race, social class, history of alcohol or opiate abuse, educational attain-
ment, . . . residential and employment stability . . . and statistics of violence in the of-
fender’s demographic”). 
 7 See Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Genetic Predictions of Future Dange-
rousness: Is There a Blueprint for Violence?, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 301, 332–37 (dis-
cussing biological factors that may be causally related to violence).  The authors ex-
plain as follows: 
All behavior is a complex intermingling of nature and nurture. . . . Al-
though most violence is perpetrated by young men against other young 
men, violent tendencies can develop prenatally or in early infancy or 
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The purpose of this Article is to propose a new standard for in-
voluntary confinement that does not require a finding of mental ill-
ness but instead, based upon numerous actuarial assessments, focuses 
on determining an individual’s likelihood of engaging in immediate 
and foreseeable acts of violence.  This new statutory scheme would 
allow for the brief detention of potentially dangerous individuals and 
thereafter permit a further period of confinement if it is demonstrat-
ed that the offender poses a high likelihood of engaging in violent 
acts.  Unlike most extant statutes, a showing of mental illness would 
not be required. 
Ultimately, the proposed statute allows for the intervention and 
brief detainment of individuals at a much earlier time, for the pur-
pose of preventing the types of horrific tragedies that have occurred 




 to Jonesboro, 
Arkansas,
10
 to Red Lake, Minnesota,
11
 and to workplace shootings that 
have occurred across the country
12
.  This Article argues that an initial, 
and potentially extended, civil commitment can—and should—be 
warranted where, by clear and convincing evidence, an individual: 
(1) poses an immediate, foreseeable threat to others (the “dange-
rousness” component); (2) has engaged in at least one overt act of 
violence within the past thirty days; and (3) is engaged in behaviors 
that are, based upon empirical data and actuarial assessments, causal-
ly related to the commission of violent acts.  If the brief intervention 
 
can emerge after the onset of puberty.  Environmental factors often 
play a role. . . . Structural dysfunction may also contribute to violent 
behavior.  Damage, the decreased metabolizing and uptake of glucose, 
reduced blood flow to the frontal lobes, and reduced function have all 
been observed in the frontal cortex of violent individuals and murder-
ers. . . . [These injuries are] associated with an increased risk of aggres-
sive and violent behavior. 
Id. at 324–29.  
 8 In 1966, Charles Whitman climbed into a tower at the University of Texas and 
shot forty-five people using a sniper rifle.  See Gary M. Lavergne‘s A Sniper in the 
Tower: The Charles Whitman Murders (1997) for a full account. 
 9 See infra Part II.A. 
 10 In 1998, two middle school students opened fire at a middle school killing five 
people.  See John Kifner, From Wild Talk and Friendship to Five Deaths in a Schoolyard, 
N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 1998, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/29/ 
us/from-wild-talk-and-friendship-to-five-deaths-in-a-schoolyard.html. 
 11 In 2005, Jeffrey Weise shot and killed his grandfather and his grandfather’s 
girlfriend and then drove to his high school where he shot and killed seven people.  
See Chris Maag, The Devil in Red Lake, TIME.COM, Mar. 27, 2005, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1042470,00.html?promoid=go
oglep. 
 12 See Workplace Shootings Fact Sheet, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/osar0014.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2011). 
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reveals that an individual poses a grave threat of immediate and/or 
foreseeable violence to the community, then further confinement 
may be warranted as long as due process standards are carefully and 
specifically implemented. 
We have the ability, in a manner that comports with due process, 
to stop a crime before it happens.  Part II will discuss the Columbine 
and Virginia Tech massacres and how the involuntary commitment 
statutes in these states failed to protect the public from such danger-
ous individuals.  Part II continues by discussing the constitutional due 
process standards enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court governing 
involuntary confinement.  Part III examines the current statutory 
schemes regarding involuntary civil confinement and concludes that 
these statutes fail to identify many individuals that are likely to en-
gage in serious acts of violence.  Part IV sets forth a two-tiered model 
statute that allows for the brief, and in some cases extended, detain-
ment of individuals based upon the immediate and foreseeable like-
lihood that such individuals will engage in violence. 
II. THE MASSACRES AT COLUMBINE AND VIRGINIA TECH 
Perhaps the most tragic aspect of the Columbine and Virginia 
Tech massacres was not only the failure of school officials to heed the 
early and imminent warning signs but also the courts’ lack of statuto-
ry authority to involuntarily commit these individuals—for an initial 
brief period—to assess their level of dangerousness and potential for 
violence.  The Colorado statute was insufficient to prevent the horrif-
ic Columbine tragedy.
13
  Specifically, while the Columbine shooters 
certainly posed an imminent threat to others, there was no evidence 
that they suffered from a mental illness.  In the Virginia Tech trage-
dy, while the shooter arguably satisfied the statutory standard, it was 
determined that outpatient treatment was the proper remedy. 
A. Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris 
The tragedy at Columbine High School never would have hap-
pened if a statute existed in Colorado that allowed for the involuntary 
commitment of both Dylan Klebold (“Klebold”) and Eric Harris 
 
 13 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-65-111(1) (West 2011). 
The court or jury shall determine that the respondent is in need of 
care and treatment only if the court or jury finds by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the person has a mental illness and, as a result of the 
mental illness, is a danger to others or to himself or herself or is gravely 
disabled. 
Id. 
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(“Harris”)—on a short-term basis—to assess their level of dangerous-
ness and potential for violence.  The overt acts and explicit threats 
made by these individuals established by clear and convincing evi-
dence that, if left untreated, they would engage in a horrific act of vi-
olence in the immediate future.  Klebold and Harris purchased fire-
arms (including a rifle, semiautomatic pistol, and sawed-off shotguns) 
and stored them in their bedrooms in preparation for the ensuing at-
tack at Columbine.
14
  Furthermore, Klebold and Harris established a 
website whereby they specifically named students that they intended 
to kill with pipe bombs at the school.
15
  They also “made videotapes of 
themselves shooting their guns and played them in school.”
16
  Per-
haps most disturbing is the fact that, in February of 1999, Klebold 
wrote a story for one of his classes detailing an assassin who “shoots 
down students and bombs the city.”
17
  He further stated that the “man 
unload[ed] one of the pistols across the fronts of [the] four inno-
cents . . . [t]he . . . streetlights caused a visible reflection off of the 
droplets of blood . . . I understood his actions.”
18
  Klebold’s teacher de-
scribed the account as “the most vicious story she’d ever read.”
19
 
Unfortunately, the administrators at Columbine, along with in-
vestigators at the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, took minimal ac-
tion to intervene and potentially prevent the horrifying tragedy.  
Amazingly, because police had previously investigated Harris’s home 
and found a pipe bomb, Columbine administrators “took no action 
because certainly they wouldn’t have wanted to interfere with an on-
going investigation.”
20
  In addition, Columbine officials were alerted 
to the website where Klebold and Harris were threatening to kill sev-
eral students, yet took no action in response.
21
  Columbine’s adminis-
 
 14 Columbine: Were There Warning Signs?, 60 MINUTES (CBS Television Broadcast 
April 17, 2001), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/04/17/60II/ 
main286163.shtml [hereinafter 60 MINUTES]. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. (emphasis added). 
 19 Id.  
 20 60 MINUTES, supra note 14.  A year before the massacre, those in charge of se-
curity at Columbine, Joe Schallmoser and Howard Cornell, “were worried that Co-
lumbine was just the kind of place where a school shooting might happen.”  Id.  Con-
sequently, in August of 1998, eight months before the Columbine attack, they “wrote 
a security plan that required school officials to notify and meet with parents and law 
enforcement as soon as they learned of ‘a threat by any student’ to ‘commit any act 
of violence.’”  Id.  They said that “Columbine didn’t follow the plan.”  Id. 
 21 Id.; see Elise M. Balkin, Comment, Rice v. Paladin: The Fourth Circuit’s Unnecessary 
Limiting of a Publisher’s Freedom of Speech, 29 U. BALT. L. REV. 205, 205 (2000); Lynne 
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trators never talked to Klebold’s or Harris’s teachers, family, or 
friends, and after reading the story by Klebold in which he detailed 
the murders of four children they again did nothing.
22
  On April 20, 
1999, Klebold and Harris killed twelve students and one teacher and 
injured twenty-three others. 
23
 
B. Seung Hui Cho 
Likewise, the Virginia Tech massacre would never have hap-
pened had there been a statute permitting the involuntary confine-
ment—for a brief period—of Seung Hui Cho (“Cho”) based upon 
the likelihood that he would engage in a violent act in the immediate 
or foreseeable future.  Instead of focusing on the “dangerousness” 
component, the court focused primarily upon Cho’s mental state 
when making the confinement determination.
24
  Beginning in his 
middle school years, Cho behaved in an isolated, withdrawn, inhi-
bited, and non-communicative manner.
25
  These behaviors continued 
through his high school years, as Cho’s “speech was barely audible 
and he did not respond in complete sentences[;] . . . he was not ver-
bally inter-active at all and was shy and shut down.”
26
  At the conclu-
 
Marie Kohm, The Rising Tide of Juvenile Violence: A Natural Disaster for Values-Free Cul-
ture, Education and Families?, 1 BARRY L. REV. 109, 109 (2000); Robert D. Richards & 
Clay Calvert, Columbine Fallout: The Long-Term Effects on Free Expression Take Hold in 
Public Schools, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1089 (2003); David Kelly, Columbine Warning Signs 
Overlooked, Evidence Shows / Young Killer Had 15 Run-ins with Law Before School Rampage, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2007, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2004-02-
27/news/17413812_1_sheriff-john-stone-sheriff-ted-mink-eric-harris; John Sarche, 
Documentary Outlines Columbine Killers’ Warning Signs, BERKLEY DAILY PLANET, Mar. 30, 
2002, available http://www.berkeleydailyplanet.com/issue/2002-03-30/article/ 
11066?headline=Documentary-outlines-Columbine-killers-warning-signs; see also Sa-
rah E. Redfield, Threats Made, Threats Posed: School and Judicial Analysis in Need of Redi-
rection, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 663 (2003) (discussing the need for courts to establish 
a set of threat assessment factors in the school context); Richard Salgado, Comment, 
Protecting Student Speech Rights While Increasing School Safety: School Jurisdiction and the 
Search for Warning Signs in a Post-Columbine/Red Lake Environment, 2005 BYU L. REV. 
1371 (2005) (discussing the line between student speech rights and educators’ needs 
for secure school environment); Scott R. Simpson, Comment, Report Card: Grading the 
Country’s Response to Columbine, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 415 (2005) (discussing federal and 
state legislation regarding school violence and recommending a grass roots approach 
to solve the problem). 
 22 See 60 MINUTES, supra note 14. 
 23 Regina Avila, Judi Acre & Jan Torpy, Columbine Timeline, DENV. POST, Apr. 16, 
2000, http://extras.denverpost.com/news/timeline.htm. 
 24 See VA. TECH REV. PANEL, MASS SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH 47–48 (2007), 
available at http://www.governor.virginia.gov/tempcontent/techPanelReport-
docs/FullReport.pdf. 
 25 Id. at 1, 35. 
 26 Id. at 36. 
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sion of his high school career, counselors determined that Cho suf-
fered from depression and social anxiety disorder.
27
 
It was at Virginia Tech, however, that Cho began to exhibit the 
early and imminent warning signs of dangerousness both to himself 
and others.  To begin with, in the fall of 2005, Cho went to a dormi-
tory party, unexpectedly brandished a knife, and proceeded to re-
peatedly stab the carpet.
28
  He also produced a paper in one of his 
classes in which he criticized his classmates for consuming meat, stat-
ing, “[y]ou low-life barbarians make me sick to my stomach.  I hope 




Cho’s dangerous behavior then began to escalate.  He was found 
with a very large knife in his desk.
30
  After further bizarre behaviors, 
which included sending strange emails to a female student, the Vir-
ginia Tech police intervened and took him into custody for an initial 
evaluation.
31
  The pre-screener found that Cho suffered from a men-
tal illness, was a danger to himself or others, and required in-patient 
hospitalization.
32
  Critically, however, at a subsequent hearing where 




The attending psychiatrist instead found that “Cho ‘is mentally 
ill; that he does not present an imminent danger to (himself/others), or is not 
substantially unable to care for himself, as a result of mental illness; 
and that he does not require involuntary hospitalization.’”
34
  Ulti-
mately, and in what represents the cornerstone of this Article, the 
Court found that, while “Cho ‘presents an imminent danger to him-
self as a result of mental illness,’” only outpatient treatment was re-
quired.
35
  Cho was subsequently discharged.
36
  The Court had the au-
thority to detain Cho yet let him go.  If Virginia had a statute 
requiring the in-patient detainment of Cho based upon the fact that 
he was an imminent danger to himself or others—regardless of men-
tal illness—the Virginia Tech tragedy may never have happened. 
 
 27 Id. at 39. 
 28 Id. at 42. 
 29 Id. 
 30 VA. TECH REV. PANEL,, supra note 24, at 45.  
 31 Id. at 47. 
 32 Id. at 47.  
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. (quoting the independent evaluator) (emphasis added). 
 35 Id. at 48 (emphasis added).  
 36 VA. TECH REV. PANEL, supra note 24, at 49. 
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Following this hearing, Cho continued his bizarre behavior, in-
cluding writing very violent stories and remaining non-
communicative in class.
37
  One student remarked that Cho “was the 
kind of guy who might go on a rampage killing.”
38
  Indeed, in the fall 
of 2007, Cho “began to purchase guns and ammunition.”
39
  The “red 
flags” were so apparent that Cho should have been, but was not, sub-
ject to involuntary confinement.  Multiple sources “expressed [con-
cern] over Cho’s behavior in the dorm,” but this was not brought to 
the attention of the school’s Care Team.
40
  Various faculty members 
“spoke up loudly about a sullen, foreboding male student who re-
fused to talk, frightened classmates and faculty with macabre writings, 
and refused faculty exhortations to get counseling.”
41
 
On April 16, 2007, Cho killed thirty-two students and injured 
approximately thirty others before killing himself,
42
 confirming the 





 37 Id. at 49. 
 38 Id. at 51. 
 39 Id. at 52. 
 40 Id.  “The Care Team at Virginia Tech was established as a means of identifying 
and working with students who have problems.”  Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See Alison Pfeffer, “Imminent Danger” and Inconsistency: The Need for National 
Reform of the “Imminent Danger” Standard for Involuntary Civil Commitment in the Wake of 
the Virginia Tech Tragedy, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 277, 277 (2008).  Pfeffer criticizes the 
“imminent danger” standard, arguing as follows: 
     The real danger at hand is the effect of such a narrow threshold on 
involuntary civil commitment.  While it may give individuals extensive 
rights, it sacrifices the needs of the mentally ill individuals who do not 
qualify and must suffer without treatment.  Individuals who are too 
mentally ill to recognize that they are in need of treatment or refuse to 
consent to treatment cannot be involuntarily committed until their 
condition has become significantly worse and treatment may be less 
successful.  In this sense, the ‘imminent danger’ standard is unba-
lanced because it preserves individual autonomy but severely under-
mines traditional theories of state power to care for and protect the 
mentally ill and society. . . . [Furthermore,] [a] lower threshold for in-
voluntary civil commitment is associated with lower incarceration rates 
and higher commitment rates due to increased exercise of parens pa-
triae power rather than police power. 
Id. at 297–99. 
 43 VA. TECH REV. PANEL, supra note 24, at 47; see also Katrina Chapman, A Preventa-
ble Strategy at Virginia Tech: Why Confusion over FERPA’s Provisions Prevents Schools from 
Addressing Student Violence, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 349, 349 (2009). 
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C. The Constitutional Requirements for Involuntary  
In-Patient Confinement 
This Article proposes a new standard governing the involuntary, 
in-patient civil confinement of dangerous individuals in such a way 
that: (1) comports with existing constitutional standards and (2) pro-
vides for the early detection and intervention of those individuals 
likely to engage in immediate and foreseeable acts of violence.  Be-
fore reviewing the extant statutes governing involuntary confinement, 
it is necessary to examine the current constitutional framework within 
which such statutes must operate. 
1. The Federal Level 
In O’Connor v. Donaldson, the Supreme Court notes that involun-
tary civil commitment implicates important due process concerns.
44
  
Specifically, involuntary commitment “must be justified on the basis 
of a legitimate state interest, and the reasons for committing a partic-
ular individual must be established in an appropriate proceeding.”
45
  
Furthermore, a “finding of ‘mental illness’ alone cannot justify a 
State’s locking a person up against his will and keeping him . . . in 
simple custodial confinement.”
46
  This is particularly true where such 
an individual “is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or 
with the help of family and friends.”
47
  Moreover, in Jackson v. Indiana, 
the Court stated that “due process requires that the nature and dura-
tion of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for 
which the individual is committed.”
48
  Involuntarily committed indi-
viduals retain a “liberty interest” and are thus entitled to safe condi-
 
 44 O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574–75 (1975); id. at 580 (Burger, J., 
concurring).  
 45 Id. at 580 (Burger, J., concurring); see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491–93 
(1980). 
 46 O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575.  The O’Connor Court further held as follows: 
The fact that state law may have authorized confinement of the harm-
less mentally ill does not itself establish a constitutionally adequate 
purpose for the confinement. . . .  
     . . . That the State has a proper interest in providing care and assis-
tance to the unfortunate goes without saying.  But the mere presence 
of mental illness does not disqualify a person from preferring his home 
to the comforts of an institution. . . . 
     . . . One might as well as if the State, to avoid public unease, could 
incarcerate all who are physically unattractive or socially eccentric.  
Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the 
deprivation of a person’s physical liberty. 
Id. at 574–75 (internal citations omitted). 
 47 Id. at 576. 
 48 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
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tions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraint, 
and, at a minimum, procedures designed to protect those interests.
49
  
Furthermore, in Zinermon v. Birch, the Court found that an individual 
must be “dangerous” to warrant involuntary confinement, holding 
that “the involuntary placement process serves to guard against the 
confinement of a person who, though mentally ill, is harmless.”
50
  
Additionally, an individual cannot be committed as a “voluntary” pa-
tient if he does not have the capacity to give informed consent.
51
 
In Addington v. Texas, the Court held that, for purposes of invo-
luntary confinement, the State must demonstrate by clear and con-
vincing evidence that an individual has a mental illness that renders 
him a danger to himself or others.
52
  The Court clarified this standard 
in Kansas v. Hendricks, stating that “[a] finding of dangerousness 
alone is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify inde-
finite involuntary commitment.”
53
  Critically, however, the Court 
noted that “[w]e have sustained civil commitment statutes when they 
have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional 
factor, such as a ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’”
54
 The Hen-
dricks Court never required the States to incorporate mental illness 
within their involuntary commitment statutes.  It only required the 
existence of some “additional factor,” which is precisely the focus of 
 
 49 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315–16, 319 (1982).  The Youngberg Court 
explained that “the right to personal security constitutes a ‘historic liberty interest’ 
protected substantively by the due process clause . . . [a]nd that right is not extin-
guished by lawful confinement, even for penal purposes.”  Id. at 315. 
 50 Zinerman v. Birch, 494 U.S. 113, 133–34 (1990).  Specifically, the Court held 
that “[p]ersons who are mentally ill and incapable of giving informed consent to 
admission would not necessarily meet the standard for involuntary placement, which 
requires either that they are likely to injure themselves or others, or that their neg-
lect or refusal to care for themselves threatens their well-being.”   Id. at 133. 
 51 Id.; cf. Washington v. Silber, 805 F. Supp. 379 (W.D. Va. 1992) (holding that an 
involuntarily committed patient could be forced to take antipsychotic drugs against 
his will, in light of the fact that the patient was substantially unable to care for him-
self, and there were no less restrictive alternative to involuntary confinement).  
 52 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 419, 432–33 (1979). 
 53 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (emphasis added). 
 54 Id. (emphasis added); see also Jennifer Honig & Susan Stefan, New Law, Policy, 
and Medicine of Involuntary Treatment: A Comprehensive Case Problem Approach to Criminal 
and Civil Aspect Outpatient Commitment Debate, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 139, 139 (2005) (reiterating that proof of dangerousness must be ac-
companied by an additional factor, thus implying that mental illness is not a required 
component of involuntary commitment).  But see Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 
(1992) (holding in a 5–4 ruling that an insanity acquittee, whose mental illness had 
been successfully treated, cannot be subject to continued confinement solely on the 
basis that he is a danger to the community). 
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the proposed statute.  Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane
55
 are notable be-
cause they upheld a statute in Kansas that authorized the involuntary 
commitment of sexual offenders after completion of their sentence, 
provided that such individuals were found to be suffering from: (1) a 
mental abnormality or defect and (2) lacked volitional control.
56
 
Federal district courts, however, have eviscerated the “dange-
rousness” component of involuntary commitment by holding that an 
individual need not engage in an overt act of violence to be involun-
tarily committed.  For example, in Covell v. Smith, the District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that “[a] finding of 
‘dangerousness’ does not require an overt act by the individual.”
57
  
Likewise, in Burruel v. Spurgeon, in rejecting petitioner’s habeas claim, 
the court held that “there is no clearly established Supreme Court law 




2. The State Court Level 
Decisions at the state court level have also impacted the nature 
and scope governing involuntary confinement.  For example, in In re 
Commitment of Dennis H., the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the 
claim that, for purposes of involuntary commitment, an individual 
must present an imminent threat of physical harm.
59
  Instead, the court 
 
 55 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (making the ruling dependent upon its determination 
that the statute was non-punitive in nature); see also David Cole, Out of the Shadows: 
Preventative Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CAL. L. REV. 693, 710–11 (2009) 
(discussing general principles governing in-patient confinement). 
 56 Crane, 521 U.S. at 356–57; see also In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109 
(2002) (upholding a virtually identical statute in New Jersey). 
 57 No. 95-501, 1996 WL 750033, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1996) (emphasis added).  
 58 No. ED CV O7-1131-AG(E), 2008 WL 624752, at *6, *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008) 
(noting that the Supreme Court has “not specifically defined the dangerousness 
element of the . . . substantive due process standard.”) (citation omitted).  
 59 In re Commitment of Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d 851, 862 (Wis. 2002). In so hold-
ing, the Court stated as follows: 
It is well-established that the state “cannot constitutionally confine 
without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving 
safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible 
family members or friends.”  This does not mean, however, that subs-
tantive due process requires the state to restrict the scope of its mental 
health commitment statutes to only those individuals who are immi-
nently physically dangerous.  There is no “single definition that must 
be used as the mental condition sufficient for involuntary mental 
commitments.”  In this complicated and difficult area, the Supreme 
Court “has wisely left the job of creating statutory definitions to the leg-
islators who draft state laws. 
Id. at 862–63 (citations omitted). 
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held that “substantive due process has not been held to require proof 
of imminent physical dangerousness to self or others as a necessary 
prerequisite to involuntary commitment.”
60
  In so holding, the court 
found constitutional a section of Wisconsin’s involuntary commit-
ment statute that required only a “substantial probability” that an in-
dividual may engage in acts of violence due to loss of volitional con-
trol.
61
  Similarly, in In re Albright,
62
 the Kansas Court of Appeals held 
that a finding of “imminency” was not required to justify involuntary 
confinement, holding that such commitment “merely ‘requires a 
showing that the potential for doing harm is great enough to justify such 
a massive curtailment of liberty.’”
63
  In accepting this lower threshold 
determination for violence, the court referred to other decisional 
law, where the imminency standard was replaced by “a serious threat 
to himself or others,”
64
 a “likelihood of inflicting serious harm on 
himself or on others,”
65




Furthermore, in In re A.S.B., the Montana Supreme Court issued 
a monumental decision, holding that involuntary commitment was 
justified where the plaintiff’s mental illness, if untreated, may deteri-
orate to such a point where he becomes a threat to public safety.
67
  
Thus, based upon relevant decisional law, if there is an individual suf-
fering from a mental illness that poses a “potential” for violence—yet 
has not exhibited any actions manifesting violent behavior—then he 




 60 Id. at 862. 
 61 Id. at 859. 
 62 In re Albright, 836 P.2d 1 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992). 
 63 Id. at 4 (quoting In re Harris, 654 P.2d 109 (Wash. 1982)) (emphasis added). 
 64 Id. (quoting Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F.Supp. 439, 451 (S.D. Iowa 1976)).  
 65 Id. (quoting Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F.Supp. 378, 391(M.D. Ala. 1974)). 
 66 Id. (quoting Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F.Supp. 509, 515 (D. Neb. 1975) (empha-
sis added)).  But see Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 178 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting Les-
sard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 421 
U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F.Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976)) (“the proper standard 
[for involuntary commitment] is that which requires a finding of imminent and sub-
stantial danger as evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or threat.”). 
 67 See In re Mental Health of A.S.B., 180 P.3d 625, 630 (Mont. 2008). 
 68 See, e.g., Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 515 (D. Neb. 1975); Hatcher v. 
Wachtel, 269 S.E.2d 849 (W.Va. 1980); In re Harris, 654 P.2d 109 (Wash. 1982); Sta-
mus v. Leonhardt, 414 F.Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976).  But see Reome v. Levine, 692 F. 
Supp. 1046 (D. Minn. 1988) (holding that confinement of an individual based upon 
dangerousness alone was insufficient where the patient was not mentally ill). 
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III. THE LEGISLATIVE STANDARDS GOVERNING INVOLUNTARY 
COMMITMENT AND THEIR FAILURE TO IDENTIFY  
THE MOST DANGEROUS INDIVIDUALS 
In light of relevant decisional law, every state has drafted its own 
statutes governing involuntary commitment.  The problem is that 
nearly every state statute includes factors that: (1) are not constitu-
tionally required by relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence and (2) 
fail to identify the most dangerous individuals because of the “mental 
illness” requirement.  Although the states have correctly included the 
“dangerousness” element in their statutes, they have incorrectly re-
quired the presence of a mental illness, which is, based upon empiri-
cal data, not in and of itself a causal factor in violence. 
These statutes assume that dangerous individuals must suffer 
from a mental disorder and that is simply incorrect.  To make matters 
worse, the relevant statutes do not require, as discussed in Part IV, the 
showing of the most relevant early and imminent warning signs of vi-
olence that should accompany the “dangerousness” calculus.  As a re-
sult, a dangerous but not-mentally ill individual can, in nearly every 
state, engage in acts of horrific violence because he or she is not eli-
gible for involuntary commitment.  We must wait until the crime hap-
pens, rather than prevent it through early intervention.  A sample of 
current statutes is demonstrative of this approach. 
A. Relevant State Statutes Governing Involuntary Confinement:   
The Wrong Emphasis on Mental Illness 
This section will (1) begin by surveying several statutes that are 
representative of and consistent with those in all states, in that they 
require a showing of mental illness for purposes of in-patient treat-
ment, and (2) proceed to demonstrate that mental illness, in and of 
itself, is not a causal factor in violent behavior. 
1. Alabama 
Alabama Code section 22-52-10.4 provides in relevant part as fol-
lows: 
(a) A respondent may be committed to in-patient treatment if the 
probate court finds, based upon clear and convincing evidence 
that: (i) the respondent is mentally ill; (ii) as a result of the men-
tal illness the respondent poses a real and present threat of sub-
stantial harm to self and/or others; (iii) the respondent will, if 
not treated, continue to suffer mental distress and will continue 
to experience deterioration of the ability to function indepen-
dently; and (iv) the respondent is unable to make a rational and 
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informed decision as to whether or not treatment for mental ill-




Arkansas Code Annotated section 20-47-207(c) provides in rele-
vant part as follows: “A person shall be eligible for involuntary admis-
sion if he or she is in such mental condition as a result of mental ill-
ness, disease, or disorder that he or she poses a clear and present 




Connecticut General Statute section 17a-498(c) provides as fol-
lows: 
If, on such hearing, the court finds by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the person complained of has psychiatric disabilities 
and is dangerous to himself or herself or others or gravely dis-
abled, it shall make an order for his or her commitment, consi-
dering whether or not a less restrictive placement is available, to a 
hospital for psychiatric disabilities to be named in such order, 
there to be confined for the period of the duration of such psy-
chiatric disabilities or until he or she is discharged or converted 





Florida Statute Annotated section 394.467(1) provides in rele-
vant part as follows: 
A person may be placed in involuntary inpatient placement for 
treatment upon a finding of the court by clear and convincing 
evidence that: 
(a)  He or she is mentally ill and because of his or her men-
tal illness: 
1.  (a) He or she has refused voluntary placement for 
treatment after sufficient and conscientious expla-
nation and disclosure of the purpose of placement 
for treatment; or 
(b) He or she is unable to determine for himself or 
herself whether placement is necessary; and 
2.  (a) He or she is manifestly incapable of surviving 
alone or with the help of willing and responsible 
 
 69 ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.4(a) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 70 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-207(c) (West 2011). 
 71 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-498(c) (West 2011). 
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family or friends . . . and, without treatment, is like-
ly to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for him-
self or herself, and such neglect or refusal poses a 
real and present threat of substantial harm to his or 
her well-being; or 
(b) There is substantial likelihood that in the near 
future he or she will inflict serious bodily harm on 
himself or herself or another person, as evidenced 





Finally, Illinois Compiled Statute chapter 405, section 5/1-119 
provides as follows: 
Persons subject to involuntary admission . . . means: 
(1) A person with mental illness who because of his or her 
illness is reasonably expected . . . to engage in conduct 
placing such person or another in physical harm or in 
reasonable expectation of being physically harmed; 
(2) A person with mental illness and who because of his or 
her illness is unable to provide for his basic physical 
needs so as to guard himself or herself from serious 
harm without the assistance of family or others . . .; or 
(3) A person with mental illness who: (i) refuses treatment 
or is not adhering adequately to prescribed treatment; 
(ii) because of the nature of his or her illness, is una-
ble to understand his or her need for treatment; and 
(iii) if not treated on an inpatient basis, is reasonably 
expected, based on his or her behavioral history, to 
suffer mental or emotional deterioration and is rea-
sonably expected, after such deterioration, to meet the 




Each of the above statutes are consistent with and representative 
of enactments across the country,
74
 which nearly all require the exis-
 
 72 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(1) (West 2011). 
 73 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-119 (West 2011). 
 74 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.30.755(a) (West 2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
36-540(A) (2011); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5250 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 27-10-102(5) (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5010 (2011); D.C. CODE § 21-
545(b) (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(9.1) (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-60.2 (West 
2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-329(11) (2011); IND. CODE ANN. §12-26-7-5(a) (West 
2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.1(16) (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2946(f) (West 
2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.026 (West 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:55(E)(1) 
(2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 3864(6)(a) (2010); MD. CODE. ANN., HEALTH-
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tence of a mental illness as a prerequisite to involuntary confine-
ment.
75
  As one commentator noted, “courts tend to regard the sever-
ity and type of symptoms of an individual’s mental illness, including 
self-destructive behavior, as indicative of whether involuntary com-
mitment is warranted.”
76
  As described below, however, mental illness 
alone does not bear a significant causal relationship to dangerous 
behavior.
77
  Thus, those individuals who are extremely—and immi-
nently—dangerous (but not mentally ill) are not subject to confine-
ment and remain a grave threat to the community. 
B. Mental Illness and Violence: The Lack of a Significant  
Causal Link 
The fatal infirmity in most states’ statutory schemes is that they 
require a showing of mental illness before an individual is eligible for 
involuntary confinement.  This requirement undermines the very 
purpose of involuntary commitment statutes because it allows dan-
gerous but non-mentally ill individuals to remain free of early detec-
tion and intervention efforts.  This is exacerbated by the lack of a 
causal relationship between mental illness and violent behavior. 
As one commentator has explained, “[m]ost violence is not 
committed by persons with mental illness; [for example,] studies sug-
 
GEN. §10-632(e)(2) (LexisNexis 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § (8)(a) (West 
2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401 (West 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
253B.09(1) (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-73(4) (2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
632.350(5) (West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126(1) (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 71-925(1) (LexisNexis 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. § 433A.310(1) (LexisNexis 2011); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:34 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.2(m) (West 2011); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. §43-1-11(c) (West 2010); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.05(b), 9.37(a) 
(McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-268(j) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-
07 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15(C) (LexisNexis 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 43A § 1-103(13)(a) (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 426.005(1)(d) (West 2011); 50 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7301 (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-8(j) (2010); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 44-17-580 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-1-2 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 33-6-501 (2010); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034 (West 2009); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 62A-15-631(10) (LexisNexis 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7101(17) 
(2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-817.C (2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.240 (West 
2011); W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(j) (LexisNexis 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.20(1)(a)(1), 
51.20(1)(a)(2) (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. §25-10-110(j) (2010); see also TREATMENT 
ADVOCACY CENTER, http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org (last visited Mar. 29, 
2011).   
 75 See Elizabeth A. McGuan, New Standards for the Involuntary Confinement of the 
Mentally Ill: Danger Redefined, 11 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 181, 200–06 (2009) (discuss-
ing the definition of “dangerousness” and how it has been defined differently among 
the states, from the threat of “imminent harm” or “substantial likelihood” of engag-
ing in violent behavior). 
 76 Pfeffer, supra note 42, at 295. 
 77 See supra Part II.  
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gest that individuals with schizophrenia account for only 5% of the 
violence that occurs society wide.”
78
  Accordingly, “[a]ttempts that 
aim to prevent events like those that took place at Columbine and 
Virginia Tech by focusing on detection and intervention among per-
sons with severe mental illness will not make society much safer.”
79
  
Indeed, one study found that “[a]pproximately 90 percent of people 
with mental disorders are in no way violent or dangerous.”
80
  Another 
report that observed patients with mental disorders one year after 
discharge from hospitalization concluded that “no significant differ-
ence [exists] between the prevalence of violence by patients without 
symptoms of substance abuse and the prevalence of violence by oth-
ers living in the same neighborhoods who were also without symp-
toms of substance abuse.”
81
  Rather, “[t]he mentally ill may in fact be 
more likely to withdraw or harm themselves than to act aggressively 
toward others.”
82
  Thus, mental illness does not bear a causal relation-




These findings were underscored by a study at the University of 
Oxford, which found that mental illness is only predictive of violence 
when there exists a co-occurring disorder such as drug or alcohol 
abuse.
84
  With respect to bi-polar disorder and schizophrenia, the re-
port stated that 
the overrepresentation of individuals with bi-polar disorder in vio-
lent crime statistics is almost entirely attributable to concurrent 
drug or alcohol abuse. . . . “In people without substance abuse 
problems, bi-polar disorder is not a problem for violent crime. . . . 
This shows we need to focus our attention on how we can detect 
those individuals with bipolar disorder and schizophrenia with 
 
 78 Mossman, supra note 1, at 136.  
 79 Id.; see also Caroline M. Mee & Harold V. Hall, Risky Business: Assessing Dange-
rousness in Hawai’i, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 63, 108–12 (2001) (discussing the various fac-
tors that contribute to violent behavior). 
 80 Loo, supra note 4 (citing Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric Dis-
order in the Community: Evidence from the Epidemiological Catchment Area Surveys, 41 
HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 761 (1990)). 
 81 Henry J. Steadman et al.. Violence by People Discharged from Acute Psychiatric Inpa-
tient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55 ARCHIVES GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 
393, 393 (1998). 
 82 Loo, supra note 4 (citing Marc Hillbrand et al., Clinical Predictors of Self-
Mutilation in Hospitalized Patients, 182 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 9 (1994). 
 83 See Steadman, supra note 81, at 393.  
 84 See Drugs and Alcohol, Not Mental Illness, Explains Violent Behavior, UNIVERSITY OF 
OXFORD (Sept. 07. 2010), http://www.ox.ac.uk/media/news_stories/ 
2010/100907.html. 
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Mental illness alone does not bear a causal relationship to the com-
mission of violent acts.  As one psychologist explains: 
It’s time that . . . we begin to knock down stereotypes and start 
breaking down the stigma associated with mental disorders.  The 
first stereotype to go down—permanently, we hope—is that 
people who suffer from depression, anxiety, schizophrenia, an 
eating disorder, or any other type of mental disorder, are some-
how more violent than others.  This simply isn’t true, unless they 
are involved in substance abuse.  Use and abuse of substances 
such as drugs or alcohol is often correlated with an increase in vi-
olence anyway . . . . Violence is most often a criminal activity 
which has little correlation with a person’s mental health.  Most 
people who suffer from a mental disorder are not violent—there 
is no need to fear them.
86
 
Thus, “people with a mental illness . . . are no more likely than any-
one else to harm strangers.”
87
 
These findings are congruous with numerous empirical studies, 
including a comprehensive study titled “Mental Illness and Violence: 
Proof or Stereotype,” which confirms that mental illness does not 
bear a causal relationship to violent conduct.
88
  In this study, re-
searchers found that “there is no consistent evidence to support the 
hypothesis that mental illness . . . that is uncomplicated by substance 
abuse[,] is a significant risk factor for violence or criminality, once 
past history of violence is controlled.”
89
  The study also found that 
“[i]t is unlikely that a member of the public would be at risk of vi-
olence from someone with a non-substance abuse disorder.”
90
 Addi-
tionally, “[p]ersons with mental illnesses are no more likely to be 
charged with a violent crime than those who do not have a mental 
illness.”
91
 Consequently, based upon the data considered in the study, 
 
 85 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Dr. Seena Fazel of the Department of Psychia-
try at the University of Oxford). 
 86 Grohol, supra note 4. 
 87 Violence and Mental Illness, CAN. MENTAL HEALTH ASS’N, http://cmha.ca/bins/ 
content_page.asp?cid=3-108 (last visited March 13, 2011). 
 88 ARBOLEDA-FLÓREZ ET AL., supra note 4. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
LAMPARELLO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2011  1:45 PM 
894 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:875 
the researchers concluded “there is no compelling scientific evidence to 
suggest that mental illness causes violence.”
92
 
Rather, individuals suffering from mental disorders are more 
likely to be the victims, rather than perpetrators, of violent crime.  
For example, existing research “shows that people with major mental 
illnesses are 2.5 times more likely to be the victims of violence rather 
than other members of society.”
93
  Another study found that “persons 
with severe mental illness are victims of violent crime in the course of 
a year . . . [a]t a rate 11 times higher than that of the general popula-
tion.”
94
  Specifically, “[p]eople with mental illnesses were eight times 
more likely to be robbed, 15 times more likely to be assaulted, and 23 
times more likely to be raped than was the general population.”
95
  As 
one commentator explains, “[t]he direction of causality is the reverse 
of common belief: persons who are seriously mentally ill are far more 
likely to be the victims of violence than its initiators.”
96
  The reasons 
supporting this conclusion are attributable, in part, to “minimal fami-
ly or community support, low socioeconomic status, social stress, so-
cial isolation, poor self-esteem and personality problems.”
97
 
Ultimately, the extant statutes governing involuntary confine-
ment make it more, rather than less, difficult to identify those indi-
viduals that are most likely to engage in violent conduct.  Indeed, in-
dividuals who pose the greatest risk for violence are not mentally ill; 
instead, they are, among other things, substance abusers.  Thus, by 
requiring a showing that a person suffers from a cognizable mental 
illness as a prerequisite to involuntary confinement, we are not only 
narrowing the class of individuals subject to confinement, but we are 
also incorrectly identifying those most at risk for engaging in acts of 
violence.  This is particularly troubling because involuntary commit-
ment statutes are not only designed to treat people with mental ill-
nesses, but they are intended to protect the community from those 
 
 92 Id.; see also Kristina M. Campbell, Blurring the Lines of the Danger Zone: The Impact 
of Kendra’s Law on the Rights of the Nonviolent Mentally Ill, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 173, 176 (2002) (stating that, in New York, involuntary outpatient com-
mitment laws do not require a showing of dangerousness); Jessica L. MacKeigan, Vi-
olence, Fear and Jason’s Law: The Needless Expansion of Social Control over the Non-
Dangerous Mentally Ill in Ohio, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 739, 749 (2008) (discussing a pro-
posed law in Ohio that would allow for the forced outpatient treatment of mentally 
ill individuals without any significant finding of dangerousness). 
 93 Violence and Mental Illness, supra note 87. 
 94 Aaron Levin, People with Mental Illness are More Often Crime Victims, PSYCHIATRIC 
NEWS (Sept. 2, 2005), http://pn.psychiatryonline.org/content/40/17/16.full. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Violence and Mental Illness, supra note 87. 
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most at risk for engaging in violent behavior.  The current statutes do 
just the opposite—they exclude from confinement the vast majority 
of individuals who, based upon a number of factors not remotely re-
lated to mental illness, are likely to engage in violent criminal con-
duct. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never required that a per-
son be mentally ill before involuntary commitment is warranted.  In-
stead, in Kansas v. Crane, the Court said that a finding of dangerous-
ness must be accompanied by an “additional” factor or factors,
98
 and 
those “additional” factors, this Article submits, should be variables 
most likely to predict, based upon actuarial assessments and other da-
ta, whether a particular individual is highly likely to engage in crimi-
nal conduct.  The involuntary commitment statutes have it back-
wards—they over-emphasize mental illness and under-emphasize 
dangerousness.  It should be the reverse, which is precisely what the 
proposed statute in this Article endeavors to accomplish.  Stated 
simply, involuntary commitment statutes should be revised to focus 
upon the “dangerousness” component, and such statutes should 
enunciate multi-factorial elements related to the dangerousness 
component that must be satisfied, such as an overt act of violence, in 
order to warrant confinement.  Of course, under such a revised sta-
tute, individuals who suffer from mental illnesses will still be subject 
to confinement if they are dangerous, but the requisite causal rela-
tionship between mental illness and violence will not be required.  In 
essence, the statute will broaden the scope of those subject to con-
finement, thus promoting greater treatment and public safety. 
IV. THE PROPOSED STATUTE GOVERNING INVOLUNTARY 
COMMITMENT: FOCUSING ON IMMEDIATE AND FORESEEABLE 
DANGEROUSNESS 
The proposed statute strives to reverse, for purposes of involun-
tary commitment, the emphasis from those who are mentally ill to 
those who pose an immediate, significant, and foreseeable threat to 
the community.  In this way, the proposed statute will broaden the 
class of individuals who may be subject to involuntary confinement by 
including dangerous but non-mentally ill individuals.  Importantly, 
however, the statute is not punitive.  Instead, it is designed, should 
involuntary confinement be deemed necessary, to provide effective 
treatment for an individual (rehabilitation), while also seeking to 
promote greater public safety (utilitarianism).  In so doing, both the 
 
 98 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997). 
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substantive and procedural due process rights of the patient will be 
strictly protected, and the confinement will be conducted in a safe 
manner that seeks to ensure effective treatment in the shortest possi-
ble timeframe. 
A. The Proposed Statute, the Early Intervention and Prevention Act 
(EIPA): Procedures Governing the Confinement of Individuals 
Likely to Engage in Immediate and/or Foreseeable Acts of Violence 
1. EIPA Statement of Purpose 
The purpose of the proposed statute, the Early Intervention and 
Prevention Act (EIPA), is to identify those individuals who pose a 
grave threat to engage in violent conduct towards themselves or oth-
ers in the immediate or foreseeable future.  Importantly, this statute 
does not require a finding of “mental illness” as a prerequisite to in-
voluntary confinement because empirical data has demonstrated that 
mental illness, in and of itself, is not a substantial causal factor in vio-
lent behavior. 
The statute is neither punitive nor retributive in nature; rather it 
seeks to provide effective treatment for those individuals whose cir-
cumstances and prior experiences render them likely to engage in 
violent acts in the immediate and foreseeable future.  More specifical-
ly, the statutory language and procedures adopted therewith are in-
tended to comply with an individual’s liberty interests and procedural 
and substantive due process safeguards.  For example, as set forth be-
low, any individual committed under this statute shall have the right 
to a safe environment in which an individualized treatment plan is 
adopted to address the individual’s particular needs and characteris-
tics.  Such treatment shall be conducted in a manner that is designed 
to ensure a successful outcome in the shortest time possible and 
through the least restrictive means available. 
Additionally, the court within the respective jurisdiction where 
involuntary confinement is conducted shall serve to oversee and en-
sure that the administration and implementation of any treatment is 
conducted in a manner that relates to the specific purposes justifying 
the initial confinement.  The court shall have other oversight duties, 
including: determining why continued confinement and treatment is 
necessary; whether treatment is being properly administered consis-
tent with the States’ initial treatment framework; setting forth partic-
ular intervals within which the State must report to the court regard-
ing the efficacy of the treatment; and ultimately placing a time-limit 
upon which the individual may be confined, regardless of whether 
treatment is successful.  The burden shall be on the State to justify in-
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itial and continued confinement, and the defendant will have, at all 
times, the ability to contest this justification and seek immediate re-
lease. 
The EIPA has the primary purpose of increasing public safety by 
treating those individuals who represent the greatest threat of engag-
ing in violent behavior.  This statute also assumes that individuals who 
are prone to immediate and foreseeable violence can successfully be 
treated in a manner that substantially reduces, if not eliminates, this 
proclivity, and thus improves the individual’s quality of life and re-
duces crime in the particular community where such individual re-
sides. 
2. EIPA Definitions 
As set forth in the statutory language, the following definitions 
shall apply: 
“Immediate threat of harm” refers to the level of danger posed 
by the particular individual for whom the State seeks confinement.  
“Immediate” does not necessarily mean “imminent,” in that the harm 
sought to be prevented is predicted to occur in a matter of hours or 
specified period of time.  This interpretation would be impractical 
and unworkable because it is simply unpredictable.  The term “im-
mediate” shall instead be construed to mean that the threat is rea-
sonably likely to occur in the near, rather than distant, future, to such 
an extent that those individuals—such as family, friends, co-workers 
and others associated with the individual—believe that there is a high 
likelihood that the individual will, in a matter of days, even weeks, 
engage in an act of violence against either himself or herself or oth-
ers.  There is no specific formula or criteria to determine whether the 
likelihood for violence is “immediate,” although it does require that 
its potential be real, substantial, and likely to occur within a short 
time period. 
“Foreseeable threat of harm” shall be construed to mean that, 
based upon an individual’s recent behavior, overt acts, and interac-
tions with others, it is reasonably likely that an act of violence will be a 
reasonably likely consequence of, or bear a causal relationship to, 
that individual’s recent behavior, overt acts, and interactions with 
others.  The term “foreseeable” does not—and should not—be con-
strued as a qualification on the term “immediate.”  Rather, it must be 
reasonably foreseeable, in the immediate future, that the individual’s 
potential for violence is likely to result from his or her preceding ac-
tions. 
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“Overt Act of Violence” shall be construed to mean that an indi-
vidual has engaged in an act of violence to himself or herself, towards 
others, or to property.  The overt act shall not be limited to acts of 
physical violence but shall include verbal threats, acts of intimidation, 
and other behaviors that are intended to place, or result in placing, 
others in fear of bodily harm. 
“Direct or Substantial Cause of Violent Behavior” shall be con-
strued to mean that an individual is engaged in behaviors that predict 
or indicate that such individual is reasonably likely to engage in an 
act or acts of violence in the immediate or foreseeable future.  The 
determination of whether an individual engages in behaviors causally 
related to violent behavior depends upon the administration of actu-
arial assessments, such as the Historical Clinical Risk-20 (HCR-20), 
Hare Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R), Level of Service Inven-
tory, and Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG), which contain nu-
merous factors, based upon prior research, that accurately predict 
whether a person is reasonably likely to engage in violent behavior.
99
  
These and other tools shall be used in determining whether an indi-
vidual poses an immediate and/or foreseeable threat of harm to him-




 99 See, e.g., David P. Farrington, Predictors, Causes and Correlates of Male Youth Vi-
olence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 421, 432–42 (1998) (listing and examining factors that cause 
violence in young males); John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting 
Harm Among Prisoners, Predators and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 409–26 (2006) (dis-
cussing the various factors that lead to violent behavior); Brian Netter, Using Group 
Statistics to Sentence Individual Criminals: An Ethical and Statistical Critique of the Virginia 
Risk Assessment Program, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 705–13 (2007) (assessing 
the factors Virginia uses in its risk-assessment program, including, but not limited to, 
age, marital status, employment status, prior criminal record, whether the offender 
acted alone when committing a particular crime, and whether the offender was in-
carcerated as a juvenile).  
 100 For example, Historical, Clinical, Risk Management–20 (HCR–20) uses the fol-
lowing twenty factors in assessing the potential for violent behavior: (1) previous vi-
olence; (2) young age at first violent incident; (3) relationship instability; (4) em-
ployment problems; (5) substance abuse problems; (6) major mental illness;  (7) 
psychopathy; (8) early maladjustment; (9) personality disorder; (10) prior supervi-
sion failure; (11) lack of insight; (12) negative attitudes; (13) active symptoms of ma-
jor mental illness; (14) impulsivity; (15) unresponsive to treatment; (16) plans lack 
feasibility; (17) exposure to destabilizers; (18) lack of personal support; (19) non-
compliance with remediation attempts; and (20) stress.  Historical, Clinical, Risk Man-
agement–20 (HCR–20), ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICAL DISORDERS, 
http://www.minddisorders.com/Flu-Inv/Historical-Clinical-Risk-Management-
20.html (last visited May 23, 2011).  See also MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK 
ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE (2001); 
GEORGES-FRANCK PINARD, LINDA PAGANI, CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF DANGEROUSNESS: 
EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS (2001). 
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“Early and Imminent Signs of Violent Behavior” refers to beha-
viors identified through empirical studies indicating whether an indi-
vidual is reasonably likely to engage in violent conduct.  “Early warn-
ing signs” are often used as a method by which to justify an initial 
intervention, but for purposes of this statute, they shall not be suffi-
cient to form the basis for involuntary confinement.  Rather, there 
must also be both: (1) direct and/or substantial causes of violent be-
havior and (2) behaviors/overt acts that suggest the commission of 
violence in the immediate future.  With respect to the “early and im-
mediate signs of violent behavior,” the following non-exhaustive list 
of factors shall be considered: 
Early Warning Signs: 
• Social withdrawal 
• Excessive feelings of isolation and being alone 
• Excessive feelings of rejection 
• Being a victim of violence 
• Feelings of being persecuted 
• Uncontrolled anger 
• Patterns of impulsive behavior 
• Drug and alcohol use 
• Access to or possession of firearms 
• Threats of violence 
• Physical fighting with peers or family members 
• Destruction of property 
• Self-injurious behavior, including suicidal ideation 
• Anti-social behavior 
• Head trauma 
• Prior criminal record101 
Immediate Warning Signs: 
• Severe rage episodes 
• Repeated acts of aggression 
• Detailed threats of lethal violence 
 
 101 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. EARLY WARNING, TIMELY RESPONSE: A GUIDE TO SAFE 
SCHOOLS (2005), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osers/osep/gtss.html (list-
ing these and other factors); see also ASS’N OF THREAT ASSESSMENT PROF’LS, RISK 
ASSESSMENT GUIDELINE ELEMENTS FOR VIOLENCE: CONSIDERATIONS FOR ASSESSING THE 
RISK OF FUTURE VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (2006), available at http://downloads. 
workplaceviolencenews.com/rage-v.pdf (listing these factors). 
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• Possession of a detailed plan outlining when and where  
violence is planned to occur 
3. EIPA § 1.1: Initial Confinement and Examination 
Whoever, presents an immediate and/or foreseeable threat of 
harm to himself or herself or others; has engaged in at least one overt 
act of violence within the past thirty (30) days; presents at least two 
factors known to be a direct or substantial cause of violent behavior; 
and presents other factors known to be early and immediate signs of 
violent behavior shall be confined, upon judicial determination, for a 
period of at least forty-eight (48) hours but not more than seventy-
two (72) hours.  During this initial-confinement period, the appro-
priate professionals shall examine such individual and, using actuari-
al instruments, such as the HCR-20, PCL-R Revised, and Level of Ser-
vice Inventory, such professional shall issue a recommendation 
stating whether involuntary confinement beyond the above-
prescribed period is necessary.  Subsequent to this recommendation, 
the individual shall be entitled to release until such time as a hearing 
is held before a Court of Law, in which the State must demonstrate, 
by clear and convincing evidence, that continued confinement is war-
ranted.  The hearing shall occur no later than seventy-two (72) hours 
after the initial recommendation by the relevant professional ex-
aminers. 
4. EIPA § 1.2: The Hearing to Determine Whether 
Continued Confinement is Warranted 
At such hearing concerning whether an individual should be 
subject to confinement beyond the period prescribed in § 1.1, the 
State has the initial burden of producing specific evidence demon-
strating, by clear and convincing evidence, that the individual pos-
sesses an immediate and/or foreseeable threat to harm himself or 
herself or others.  The State’s evidence shall include, but will not 
necessarily be limited to, expert testimony explaining why, on the ba-
sis of prior actuarial assessments (e.g., the HCR-20), continued con-
finement is warranted.  More specifically, the State shall set forth, 
based upon actuarial instruments, the particular factors that render 
the individual an immediate and/or foreseeable threat to himself or 
herself or others.  The State shall then have the additional burden of 
articulating a specific and individualized treatment plan (i.e., beha-
vioral therapy and/or a medication regimen that is related to the 
purposes justifying the individual’s continued confinement).  The 
State shall also specify the time period within which such treatment 
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plan is likely to be successful and endeavor to select the shortest time 
period possible. 
The individual for whom confinement is sought has the right to 
an attorney—paid for by the State if the individual is indigent—and 
any witnesses to testify on his or her behalf that such individual does 
not represent an immediate and/or foreseeable danger to himself or 
herself or others and/or that such individual has sufficient support 
among family, friends, and others that shall deem confinement un-
necessary.  The individual shall also have the right to present, at the 
State’s expense, any experts who will testify that the individual is not 
and does not present an immediate and/or foreseeable danger to the 
community, and such individual shall also have access to all actuarial 
and clinical instruments to support such contention. 
5.  EIPA § 1.3: The Type of Confinement Warranted by 
the Individual’s Threat Level
102
 
After hearing all of the evidence proffered by both parties, the 
Court shall have the discretion to enter an Order either: (1) deter-
mining that continued confinement is not necessary because the in-
dividual does not satisfy the statutory factors governing involuntary 
confinement; (2) stating that continued confinement is necessary be-
cause the individual represents, by clear and convincing evidence, a 
threat to himself or herself or others, has engaged in at least one 
overt act of violence in the last thirty (30) days, and is likely to com-
mit a further act of violence in the immediate and/or foreseeable fu-
ture; or (3) that the individual has sufficient support among family, 
friends, and others such that an immediate and/or foreseeable act of 
violence is not likely to occur.  Based upon the Court’s determination 
regarding the level of risk presented by the individual, the following 
treatment options shall be available: 
a. EIPA § 1.3(a): Voluntary Commitment 
At any time prior to or during the hearing, the individual may 
knowingly, voluntarily, and willingly consent to a period of confine-
ment in which the individual is subject to intervention and treatment.  
This consent is conditioned upon the State detailing to the individual 
the nature and purpose of confinement, the specific type of treat-
ment he or she shall receive, and the estimated duration of confine-
ment.  Should the State fail to delineate any of these components to 
the individual, informed consent cannot be valid as a matter of law. 
 
 102 See Parry, supra note 2, at 322–23 (detailing types of civil commitment). 
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b. EIPA § 1.3(b): Outpatient Commitment 
After the plenary hearing in which the Court considers all evi-
dence and determines the level and nature of risk presented by the 
individual, it shall have within its discretion the authority to order the 
individual to undergo an outpatient commitment program.  The rea-
sons underlying such decision may include, but are not limited to: 
(1) the individual having a sufficient support structure (i.e., family, 
friends, and others associated with the individual who can provide for 
the individual’s basic needs and ensure his or her safety as well as that 
of others); (2) the determination that the individual is not at risk to 
commit a violent act in the immediate and/or foreseeable future; or 
(3) the individual presenting an alternative, outpatient program that 
the Court deems sufficient to ensure successful treatment by the least 
restrictive means possible.  Should outpatient treatment fail, however, 
the State shall have within its authority the power to petition the 
Court that in-patient treatment is necessary to address and treat the 
individual’s violent proclivities. 
c. EIPA § 1.3(c): In-Patient Commitment 
After a plenary hearing, if the Court determines that the indi-
vidual poses an immediate and/or foreseeable threat to himself or 
herself or others, it shall have the power to enter an Order authoriz-
ing the involuntary in-patient commitment of such individual.  Such 
decision, however, will be contingent upon a specific treatment plan 
designed by the State detailing the procedural and substantive as-
pects that are intended to ensure a successful outcome within a par-
ticular time period. 
6. EIPA § 1.4: The Time Constraints and Procedures 
Governing In-Patient Confinement 
Should the State present clear and convincing evidence that the 
individual poses an immediate and/or foreseeable threat to himself 
or herself or others, the State shall, as stated above, specify an initial 
time period—the first stage of confinement—within which it believes  
it can successfully implement the particular treatment plan.  In any 
case, the State may not petition for the first stage of confinement of 
any individual for a period exceeding thirty (30) days.  The Court 
shall then review the State’s evidence and independently set forth the 
timeframe governing the first stage of confinement. 
Thereafter, the State must reappear before the Court every fif-
teen (15) days to demonstrate that: (1) the individual is receiving the 
treatment plan as outlined in its initial petition for confinement and 
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(2) the individual’s treatment is proceeding successfully.  If, however, 
the State believes that an alternative treatment plan may be or is ne-
cessary, it must present to the Court, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, why such treatment is necessary.  At this hearing, the State 
shall also inform the Court whether the individual is likely to be dis-
charged after the initial thirty (30) day period or whether confine-
ment after that period may be necessary.  The procedures for ex-
tended confinement beyond the initial thirty (30) day period are set 
forth in EIPA § 1.5. 
At anytime during his or her confinement, the individual shall 
have the opportunity to petition to the Court that: (1) confinement is 
no longer necessary because such individual does not present an im-
mediate and/or foreseeable risk to himself or herself or others; (2) 
the State is not providing the individual with the specific treatment 
plan that it proffered before the Court justifying the first thirty (30) 
day stage of confinement; (3) the defendant has been treated to such 
an extent that, with the support of family, friends, and others, he or 
she is not an immediate and/or foreseeable harm to others; or (4) 
there are lesser restrictive means (i.e., outpatient commitment) that 
will be reasonably likely to result in a successful treatment outcome. 
7. EIPA § 1.5: Extended Confinement Beyond the First 
Thirty (30) Day In-Patient Confinement Period 
Prior to the expiration of the initial thirty (30) day period, the 
State shall have the right to petition the Court that confinement 
beyond the thirty (30) day period is necessary.  Importantly, however, 
the State may not base its justification upon the evidence used to 
support the initial thirty (30) day confinement petition.  The State 
must adduce, by clear and convincing evidence, that continued con-
finement is necessary because, inter alia: (1) the individual’s treat-
ment plan requires more time to ensure a successful outcome; (2) 
the individual has not fully complied with the treatment plan, thus 
necessitating an extended period to ensure a successful outcome; or 
(3) the individual remains an immediate and/or foreseeable threat, 
based upon new evidence, which justifies continued confinement. 
At this hearing, the individual shall have the right to State-
appointed counsel as well as experts who may testify that continued 
confinement is no longer necessary because, inter alia: (1) the treat-
ment plan has been successful to a sufficient extent that the individu-
al can live safely in the community and no longer represents an im-
mediate and/or foreseeable harm to himself or herself or others or 
(2) the treatment plan is not—or will not be—successful in assisting 
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the individual and that alternative methods will be both available and 
more effective. 
8. EIPA § 1.6: Maximum Term of In-Patient Confinement 
In each case that concerns the involuntary confinement of an 
individual, the maximum term within which such individual may be 
confined shall not exceed ninety (90) days. 
9. EIPA § 1.7: Post-Release Procedures 
After the individual is released from confinement, the State shall 
have no authority to petition for that individual’s re-confinement un-
less new evidence emerges demonstrating that such individual: (1) 
presents an immediate and/or foreseeable threat of harm to himself 
or herself or others; (2) has engaged in at least one overt act of vi-
olence within the past thirty (30) days; or (3) presents at least two of 
the factors known to be a direct or substantial cause of violent beha-
vior and at least one additional factor known to be an early and im-
mediate signs of violent behavior. 
B. Objections to this Proposal 
There are likely to be several objections to this proposal, based 
upon both constitutional and workability grounds.  These objections 
are important and necessary because they directly influence how the 
statute should be drafted, implemented, and administered.  The two 
primary objections to this proposal will be that: (1)  confining an in-
dividual before the commitment of any criminal act violates an indi-
vidual’s liberty interest under the Constitution, and (2) there is no 
way to accurately predict whether an individual is likely to engage in 
violent behavior, thus rendering confinement unworkable and de fac-
to punitive. 
1. Involuntary Confinement of Individuals  
Reasonably Likely to Engage in Immediate and/or 
Foreseeable Acts of Violence Is Tantamount to 
Confining an Individual Before Any Criminal Act Has 
Been Committed 
The first—and perhaps primary—objection to this proposal is 
that it seeks to confine innocent individuals based upon a belief that 
they will, at some point in the future, commit a criminal act.  This 
type of confinement not only violates an individual’s liberty interest 
under the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment but also transgresses the very foundation upon which the depri-
LAMPARELLO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2011  1:45 PM 
2011] WHY WAIT UNTIL CRIME HAPPENS? 905 
vation of liberty is founded—that an individual must engage in a 
criminal act before confinement is warranted. 
This argument has superficial appeal but fails when considered 
in light of the current policies governing involuntary confinement.  
First, involuntary in-patient confinement of the dangerous and men-
tally ill is already authorized in every state in the country.  When con-
finement is ordered, such individuals have neither violated criminal 
law nor engaged in overt acts indicating that they will commit acts of 
violence in the imminent future.  In fact, courts at the state level have 
held that commitment of the dangerous and mentally ill is warranted 
even where such individuals have committed no overt act whatsoever 
indicating the propensity for violence.
103
  To make matters worse, 
many state statutes have dispensed with the requirement that the in-
dividual pose a threat of “imminent” harm and have instead autho-
rized confinement, for example, where there exists a “substantial like-
lihood” that a violent act will occur in the near future.
104
 
Consequently, by requiring no overt act or imminent threat of 
harm, these statutes emphasize and seek to confine those who have a 
mental illness.  This is particularly troubling because there is no di-
rect causal relationship between mental illness and violent behavior.  
The American penal system already confines people for reasons that 
have nothing to do with violations of the law, at any time, or for any 
reason.  The current involuntary commitment statutes confine men-
tally ill individuals who present no harm whatsoever to themselves or 
others. 
The proposed statute, however, goes further in protecting an in-
dividual’s substantive and procedural due process rights.  The indi-
vidual must, based upon numerous factors including actuarial as-
sessments and early and imminent warning signs that bear a causal 
relationship to violent behavior, present a danger to himself or her-
self or others.  The individual also must have engaged in at least one 
overt act of violence within the past thirty days.  Thus, the finding of 
dangerousness is based more upon the facts of a particular case ra-
ther than upon predictions of or assumptions that an individual may 
engage in a violent act. 
Moreover, the State has a substantial burden to justify the first 
and continued stages of confinement.  The State must set forth a spe-
cific treatment plan that is likely to successfully rehabilitate the indi-
vidual, and continued confinement past the initial thirty day period is 
 
 103 See supra Part II.C.2. 
 104 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(1) (West 2011).  
LAMPARELLO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2011  1:45 PM 
906 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:875 
based solely upon the efficacy of the treatment and whether such 
treatment either needs to be continued or altered to ensure a suc-
cessful outcome.  In this way, the statute is not punitive in nature.  It 
is rehabilitative and utilitarian because it strives to ensure proper 
treatment and thus promote increased public safety. 
Finally, at any time, the individual can petition the court for 
immediate release or for a less restrictive means of confinement (i.e., 
an outpatient treatment plan).  In any event, confinement can last no 
longer than ninety days.  Consequently, by focusing upon an individ-
ual’s behaviors (prior overt acts and warning signs directly linked to 
criminal behavior), this proposal creates a much more solid basis 
upon which to justify confinement.  Furthermore, by excluding men-
tal illness from this statute, it explicitly—and properly—recognizes 
that mentally ill individuals are not inherently prone to violence.  
The only instance in which a mentally ill individual should be con-
fined is when the elements of the proposed statute are satisfied.  If 
the elements are satisfied, it will likely not be the result of a mental 
illness but environmental and biological factors that warrant treat-
ment. 
2. There Is No Method by Which to Accurately Predict 
Whether an Individual Is Reasonably Likely to Engage 
in Violent Behavior 
Some may argue that there is no way to accurately predict 
whether and individual is reasonably likely to engage in violent beha-
vior.  This argument is partially true but depends upon the tools that 
are used to assess the likelihood of future dangerousness.  For exam-
ple, clinical evidence, namely the testimony of experts concerning 
whether an individual is likely to engage in future acts of violence, is 
notoriously unreliable.  Expert testimony concerning future dange-
rousness is not very accurate. In 1983, in the context of long-term 
sentencing, the American Psychiatric Association stated the following: 
Psychiatrists should not be permitted to offer a prediction con-
cerning the long-term future dangerousness in a capital case, at 
least in those circumstances where the psychiatrist purports to be 
testifying as a medical expert possessing predictive expertise in 
this area . . . Medical knowledge has simply not advanced to the 
point where long-term predictions . . . may be made with even 
reasonable accuracy . . . [E]ven under the best of conditions, psy-
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chiatric predictions of long-term future dangerousness are wrong 
in at least two out of every three cases.
105
 
As one commentator explains, “peer-reviewed research . . . has 
more recently bolstered these conclusions.”
106
  Specifically, “[m]ental 
health professionals themselves are entirely skeptical of their own 
predictions, [and] academics appear to have unanimously accepted 
that such professionals are unreliable.”
107
  For example, a dangerous-
ness prediction in the capital context has been described as “sober-
ing, both in its inability to discriminate who will and will not engage 
in violent misconduct in prison and in the minority who fulfill the 
prediction.”
108
  These studies reveal “low quality control for . . . dan-




Furthermore, “more recent and more methodologically sound 
studies indicate that mental health professionals are [only] moderate-
ly better than chance in predicting long-term dangerousness.”
110
  
Moreover, “[e]ven with extensive interviewing . . . studies show that 
clinical predictions do not improve substantially.”
111
  As a result, the 
existing literature suggests that: (1) mental health practitioners’ fu-
ture violence predictions are inaccurate; (2) they lack training in 
making future dangerousness predictions; and (3) based upon a 




Importantly, the proposed statute does not rely upon or even 
utilize clinical testimony.  Instead, it incorporates several instruments, 
including the HCR-20, PCL-R, and Level of Service Inventory, which 
contain factors that are known to accurately predict whether an indi-
vidual is likely to engage in violent behavior.
113
  Furthermore, this 
 
 105 Meghan Shapiro, An Overdose of Dangerousness: How “Future Dangerousness” 
Catches the Least Culpable Capital Defendants and Undermines the Rationale for the Execu-
tions It Supports, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 145, 161 (2008) (emphasis added).  
 106 Id. (citing Amicus Brief of the American Psychiatric Ass’n for Petitioner at 14, 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080), 1982 U.S. Briefs 6080 (1982)). 
 107 Id.  
 108 Mark D. Cunningham, Thomas J. Reidy, & Jon R. Sorensen, Assertions of “Future 
Dangerousness” at Federal Capital Sentencing: Rates and Correlates of Subsequent Prison Mis-
conduct and Violence, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 46, 61 (2008).  
 109 Shapiro, supra note 105, at 163. 
 110 Mitzi Dorland & Daniel Krauss, The Danger of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing: 
Exacerbating the Problem of Arbitrary and Capricious Decision-Making, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. 
REV. 63, 85 (2005).  
 111 Id.  
 112 Id. at 86. 
 113 See supra note 99. 
LAMPARELLO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2011  1:45 PM 
908 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:875 
proposal requires that, prior to confinement, an individual must en-
gage in an overtly violent act, indicating a violence assessment that is 
specific to the individual.  The proposed statute, therefore, does not 
use the types of unreliable clinical testimony that lie at the heart of 
this argument and for that reason, the argument fails. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The massacre at Columbine could have, or at least may have, 
been prevented if Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris were subjected to 
state intervention and confinement based upon their likelihood of 
engaging in immediate and foreseeable acts of violence.  Klebold and 
Harris created a website naming specific students that they wanted to 
murder.  They possessed and accumulated firearms.  They drafted 
stories of an extremely violent and horrific nature.  These behaviors 
did not merely suggest that they were planning on committing one of 
the worst acts of school violence in our Nation’s history; they essen-
tially broadcasted their plans to everyone and anyone who paid atten-
tion.  However, if anyone in Colorado sought to involuntarily commit 
either of these individuals, they would have had the unnecessary bur-
den of demonstrating that Klebold and Harris were mentally ill. 
Mental illness, however, is not causally related to violent beha-
vior.  It is likely that any attempts to confine them would have failed.  
Under the proposed statute delineated above, they would have never 
walked away from the courtroom.  They would have been involuntari-
ly confined in an in-patient setting.  Similarly, Seung Hui Cho would 
have been identified as an immediate danger to the community.  His 
confinement may have prevented the Virginia Tech tragedy.  The 
same holds true for other individuals who engage in acts of violence, 
whether they are stalkers or those who engage in repeated acts of 
domestic violence.  We should not have to wait for forty-five students 
to be killed in order to intervene.  We can stop violence before it 
happens, and we should begin to do so now. 
 
